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The Impact of Early Commitment on Games
Played: Evidence from College
Football Recruiting
Jesse Bricker* and Andrew Hansont
We use data on athletic scholarship acceptance decisions to show that high school football
players signal their ability level by delaying commitment. Although colleges can obtain
information about student athletes, National Collegiate Athletic Association regulations limit
information flow, making private information an important component of the scholarship
market. Using ordinary least squares, censored regression, and negative binomial estimation,
we show that for a given observed ability level, committing to a scholarship offer early is
associated with less playing time after acceptance. In one season and at a typical average early
signing date, early-committing athletes played in 0.21 fewer games per season, or about 4% of
the average number of games played.
JEL Classification: D82, L83

1. Introduction
Information asymmetries are common in social and economic transactions between
two parties. Economic agents may have the opportunity to signal positive private
information by taking on extra costs, for example, by delaying action (Tracy 1987;
Kennan and Wilson 1989; Conlin 1999; Conlin and Emerson 2003) or by taking on higher
mental costs (Spence 1973). Typically researchers examine signaling behavior in adult
decision makers, some of whom may be highly educated or have experience with
bargaining. I
We add to this literature by testing for signaling behavior when the economic agent is
arguably less sophisticated. Specifically, we test for signaling of private information by high
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school student athletes when committing to attend a university on a football scholarship.2
Universities covet highly skilled football players because a successful college football team can
earn a university millions of dollars annually; in fact, Brown (1993) estimates a premium college
football player generates over $500,000 in annual revenue. 3
We model a student athlete's decision to accept a scholarship based on a signaling model
where players have private information about their ability. The model demonstrates that highability athletes are able to signal private information by delaying commitment to a university
scholarship. The model implies that players who delay initial commitment to a university will
be higher ability ex post than players who commit early.
We test the signaling hypothesis using data on high school athletes from Rivals.com, a web
site that follows high school football recruiting. 4 Our results indicate that, for a given observed
ability level, student athletes committing early garner less playing time in subsequent seasons than
those who delay initial commitment. For example, using our estimates from the 2004 season,
athletes who commit at a typical average early signing date play in 0.21 fewer games, which
represents roughly 4% of the average number of games played (5.90) by our sample in 2004.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In section 2 we discuss the recruiting
process and details of high school athlete commitment decisions. In section 3 we demonstrate a
simple separating equilibrium model of a high school athlete's commitment decision. Section 4
describes our data, estimating equations, and results. Section 5 concludes.

2. The Recruiting Process
College coaches spend a significant amount of time recruiting high school athletes. The success of a
coach on the field often comes through the quality of the players that he is able to bring to a university.
Kahn (2006) indicates that a coach's salary depends on his ability as a recruiter. Coaches identify talent
through watching film of thousands of recruits playing high school football, or by watching the
student's high school team play in person. Once a coach identifies a talented player, they will try to
develop a relationship with the player in order to entice them to accept a scholarship offer. The coach
will make frequent phone calls and will travel to talk to the family, friends, and coaches of the recruit.
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) regulates the recruiting process of
high school football players. Each year in early February, on National Signing Day (NSD),
universities may sign up to 25 football players to an athletic scholarship (teams may have 85
scholarship athletes total).5 On NSD, student athletes sign binding National Letters of Intent
(NU) stating their commitment to attend a school and play football.
Higb scbool football players often get advice from their parents or higb scbool coacb who may have prior experience
with former players making the same decision; however, the decision to commit to a scholarship is their own.
3 The by-laws governing collegiate athletics prohibit universities from offering a wage to student athletes; the National
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) sets these by-laws. Kahn (2006) provides a general overview of the NCAA
regulations in several other collegiate sports and examines the cartel-like characteristics of the NCAA. McKenzie and
Sullivan (1987) argue that the NCAA is not a cartel.
4 Over the last decade, the college commitment decisions of high school football players have become increasingly
scrutinized and heavily followed. ESPN, a major sports broadcast network, regularly reports on the commitment
decisions of t. . most highly regarded high school atWetes.
5 If schools continually sign their limit of players annually, the total scholarship limit means schools must have attrition
(25 X 4 > 85). Attrition is usually due to poor classroom performance or leaving school early to play professionally,
though schools are able rescind a scholarship. According to NCAA legislation and governance circulated in 2009, the
NLI only guarantees an athletic scholarship for one year; bowever, it is common practice to renew annually after the
first year.

2

Early Commitments

973

Recruiting for an entering freshman class begins early the previous year. Contact between
a college coach and a high school student athlete is regulated and kept to a minimum for much
of the process. 6 As a result, there is ample room for information asymmetries. Prior to NSD,
contact with recruits is limited to one phone call per week outside of scheduled campus and inhome visits, which can take place only during a certain period. Football coaches may view a
recruit's high school practice and games only during limited time windows.
The size of the athletics budget and the quality of the football program determine the
number of recruits that a university will target. Large universities spend at least $100,000 and
sometimes as much as $1,000,000 annually on recruiting of high school football players. For
example, the University of Tennessee reported that it spent $900,000 on football recruiting in
2007, while the University of Mississippi spent nearly $400,000. For comparison, of the 12
teams in their athletic conference, the University of Mississippi budget ranked ninth (Feldman
2007).
In the absence of pay, a scholarship varies only by the quality of the education and quality
of the football program. The quality of the coaching staff and the quality of the facilities will
allow the athlete to become a better player; the exposure at a university will allow the athlete to
showcase his skill to the public and to future employers in professional football leagues. Kahn
(2006, p. 13) points out that "it is likely that NCAA rules on player compensation raise the
[marginal revenue product] of effective coaches and the value of top quality facilities, since
these become the primary means of attracting athletes."
The maximum number of commitments per year is 25, but a school may offer scholarships
to more than 100 players during a recruiting period. Schools offer many scholarships
understanding that the probability of signing anyone player is low. This also means that a
player knows that if he waits too long and 25 players have already committed, the scholarship
offer may no longer be available. The scholarship offer is revocable, and, once offered, the
school may lose interest in the player. 7
Although the offer is not contractually binding on either side until a recruit signs his NLI
on NSD, many recruits announce their decisions early through a verbal commitment. It is
relatively uncommon for recruits to change their college decision between announcing a verbal
commitment and signing the formal contract, although it does happen. 8 Typically, if a recruit
changes his commitment decision it is because of coaching turnover at the university or a better
opportunity arising. For the most part, recruiting stops once a player has signed his letter of
intent. The penalty for transferring to another school after signing a NLI is for the player to sit
out a season before playing for another school. 9
New forms of communication cause these rules to be in a constant state of flux . For example, because the NCAA did
not explicitly prohibit sending text messages, some coaches sent multiple text messages per day to recruits (Feldman
2007). The NCAA later explicitly prohibited text messaging (O'Neil 2008). Yen (2011) also provides further details on
the NCAA recruiting process.
7 Scholarships may remain open after NSD for the most talented players. Two recent examples are Terrell Pryor (class of
2008) and David Oku (class of 2009). Three schools (Ohio State University, Pennsylvania State University, and the
University of Michigan) kept a scholarship open for Terrell Prior until after NSD. Two schools (Syracuse University
and the University of Tennessee) kept a scholarship open for David Oku until after NSD. Crabtree (2009) and Staples
(2008) describe these stories.
8 Staples (2012) finds that 12.4% of top football recruits made such a change in commitment.
9 A player in our sample can transfer without sitting out a season if he transfers to a Football Championship Subdivision
(FCS, formerly I-AA), Division II, or Division III school. The exposure at these schools is much lower than at a top
FBS school.
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3. Modeling the Commitment Decision
This section presents a simple model examining the decision of a student-athlete to accept
a scholarship offer to attend a particular university. The model assumes the student-athlete
holds private information on their ability and reveals this information through the decision
when to commit to accept a particular scholarship offer. The model derives a single crossing
property that allows a separating equilibrium where a student-athlete with better private
information makes a later commitment. Potential college student athletes may be especially
likely to hold private information about their abilities considering the stringent rules the NCAA
imposes on contact with coaches and the imperfect ability of coaches to judge young athletes.
For an econometric model of the factors that recruits consider in the decision on what
scholarship to accept, see Dumond, Lynch, and Platania (2008).
Let i index the type of private information that the student-athlete holds. An increase in i
is associated with a student-athlete holding more "positive" private information, which will
make him a higher quality student-athlete. There are two time periods: the current time (T = 0)
and a future time (T = t). At the current time, the student-athlete may commit to his most
preferred scholarship offer and derive an expected utility S. Alternatively, the student-athlete
can delay the commitment decision until time t. We assume that by time t, student-athlete i
receives a more preferable scholarship offer with probability Pi, and Pi increases with i. The
expected utility from the more preferred offer is Up, where Up > S. The cost of delaying
commitment is C for student athletes with all types of private information. 10
The private information type that is just indifferent between committing now and delaying
commitment is type 1, so that C = Pie Up - S). Because the expected benefit from delaying
commitment, Pi (Up - S), increases with i and the cost ~f delaying commitment does not vary
with i, those with lower quality (private information) commit now ('if i < 1), and those with
higher quality (private information) commit later ('if i > 1). The resulting separating equilibrium
is based on the quality of private information held by the student-athlete and the fact that this
information increases the probability a more preferred scholarship is offered.

4. Empirical Tests
We test for evidence of signaling using ex-post data on collegiate playing careers matched
to data on the timing of the original commitment student athletes make to accept a football
scholarship. Our prediction is that high-ability types will delay initial commitment, or that
committing to a football scholarship early is associated with lower ability ex post.
Our measure of ex post quality is the number of games an athlete plays in a football
season. The primary reason for this choice is to have a uniform measure across position types.
Some positions have measurable outcomes (e.g., for running backs, a measure of quality is
number of times they touch the ball and number of yards they run for) whereas others do not
(an offensive lineman has no specific quality measure). For all positions, playing in a game

10

These costs are associated with the student-athlete not resolving the uncertainty in their decision resulting in stress.
Modeling this cost as the probability a scholarship is withdrawn results in a separating equilibrium with similar
empirical implications.
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demonstrates higher quality than not playing. The data on the number of games student
athletes play in come from College Football Stats.com (CFBstats.com).
We measure the timing of commitment as the number of days prior to the NSD that a
recruit commits to a university. We collect information on the commitment date of recruits
from Rivals.com. 11 Figure 1 shows the distribution of scholarship commitments relative to the
NSD. As shown in Figure I, many recruits (about 10% of our sample) wait until NSD to
commit. 12 Rivals.com gathers information on the physical characteristics of student athletes,
such as height, weight, and speed, and it ranks recruits according to a subjective measure of
observed ability.
The Rivals.com recruiting data start in 2002 with that year's freshman class and spans
through the 2005 freshman class, for a total of four years. The game statistics data starts with
the 2003 season, when the initial recruiting class is sophomores, and spans through the 2006
season, one year after most of the initial class graduates. Table 1 shows how the recruiting class
data correspond to the game statistics data . Our sample is limited to 66 major Football Bowl
Subdivision colleges from the Bowl Championship Series (BCS) conferences: the Atlantic
Coast, the Big 10, the Big 12, the Big East, the Southeastern, and the Pacific 10, as well as one
unaffiliated university (Notre Dame).13
Table 2 shows the general trend that players who delay commitment play in more of their
team's games in a given season. The second column under each season (2003- 2006) shows the
average number of days prior to the NLI deadline that a recruit gave his commitment to the
school. In general, Table 2 shows that the fewer days prior to the deadline that a recruit gives a
commitment, the more games he plays in for any given season. This is especially apparent for
athletes who play in most of their teams' games. The average number of days prior to the
deadline for athletes who play in 10 or more games is less than the sample average in all years of
our data. The average number of days prior to the deadline for athletes who play in three or
fewer games is more than the sample average (2005 being the exception).

Ordinary Least Squares ( OLS) Estimation
To formally analyze the link between commitment date and quality, we estimate the
number of games played as a linear function of the number of days prior to the deadline,
controlling for other factors, using ordinary least squares (OLS): 14 Our estimating equation is
the following:
Games) = CX+ PI (Days Pr ior)j + P2(Ranked = l)j +
P3(Ranked = 1 x Observed AbilitY)j + P4(Home State)j +l1c+ 8p + A/ +Ej .

(1)

The dependent variable is the number of games played in a given season for an individual
player (j), from recruiting class (c) , playing position (P) , at school (£) . Days Prior is the primary
Yahoo! acquired Rivals.com in 2007 for $100 million dollars, a testament to the heavy web traffic on the site.
A commitment on the part of a recruit is changeable until NSD. We observe the day that a particular recruit declared
. his intention to play for the school with which he eventually signed a NLI.
13 See Appendix I for a list of schools in our sample. Our sample includes Notre Dame, despite not being affiliated with a
BCS conference, because they receive special consideration for BCS bowl games.
14 When using OLS to estin3ate ~ , we maintain assumptions that E is a mean zero random variable that is orthogonal to
the covariates in the regression model. A further assumption of the OLS model is that E is homoskedastic. In practice,
by clustering our standard errors at the school-by-recruiting class level we do not maintain this assumption.
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Figure 1. Distribution of Recruit Commitment Days Prior to Signing Day

variable of interest and is the number of days prior to NSD a recruit makes a verbal
commitment to play for the school where they sign a scholarship offer. We estimate separate
regressions for each season we have games played data on.
Ranked is a variable equal to one if Rivals.com ranks the student athlete by observed
ability. Observed Ability is the national ranking of the player from Rivals.com (ranging from 1
to 182, with I being the best ranking). Rivals.com ranks approximately 62% of high school
student athletes in the sample. We use the subjective rank, instead of more objective measures
of ability such as speed and strength, because different positions require unique abilities. For
example, running speed is important for running backs but less so for defensive linemen, and
the fastest defensive lineman is slower than the slowest running back.

Table 1. Data Summary for Recruiting Classes and Game Statistics
Game Statistics (Year)
Recruiting Class

2002
2003
2004
2005

2003

2004

2005

2006

X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

2006 game statistics include some players from the 2002 recruiting class; however, many of these players were
already graduated or were no longer in college for other reasons. Players are eligible to play football for four seasons.
Players are not required to play four consecutive years and may take a year to mature physically or recover from injury.
It is common practice for players to do tills during their freshman season.
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Table 2. Average Number of Days Signed Prior to National Signing Day, by Games Played
2003 Season
Games Played

N

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

194
196
134
48
36
37
52
55

13

14
15
Total

77

74
63
92
152
135
10
4
1359

Avg. Days

64

73
68
94
47
60
58
66
55
50
42
48
50
42
54
27
59

2004 Season
N

Avg. Days

643
156
89
84
63
83
69
69
103
112
167
358
289
68

77

2353

2005 Season
N

Avg. Days

99
85
68
78
75
64
57
56
60
59

617
168
105
103
68
84
85
119
129
187
250
619
460
107

82
73
108
66
85
81
75
74
80
70
66
80

71

3101

79

93
76
77

99
78

2006 Season
N

Avg. Days

258
133
89
83
71
75
68
101
110
115
149
240
654
688
153

95
97
103
99
82
79
84

2987

85

72

90
97
85
82
81
83
69

Home State is a dummy variable equal to one if the player makes a commitment to a
school in his state of residence. The rationale for including this variable is that geographically
close schools may be able to gain access to information about a recruit that other schools
cannot. Finally, Yl measures recruiting class fIXed effects, e measures position fIXed effects, and
').. is a school fixed effect. We create dummy variables for three types of football positions in our
regression analysis: quarterback, "skill" positions (running back, wide receiver, cornerback,
safety, linebacker, tight end), and linemen (both offensive line and defensive line).15 All
specifications cluster standard errors at the school-by-recruiting class level.
Table 3 presents estimation results for Equation 1 both with and without the Ranked and
Ranked X Observed Ability variables. As shown in Panel A of Table 3, the negative relationship
between the Days Prior variable and games played is strong in all years, controlling for
recruitment class, home state, position, and school. The magnitude of the effect of signaling by
delaying commitment on games played is substantial. In 2004 a student who committed 71 days
prior to NSD (the mean in 2004) played 0.19 fewer games during the season . The 0.19 games
magnitude represents 3% of the mean number of games played (5.90) in 2004. The Days Prior
estimate is precisely estimated, standard errors are small compared to the point estimates, and
the estimated effect is statistically significant at no less than the 10% level in all years.
In Panel B of Table 3, we add the Ranked and Ranked X Observed Ability variables and
reestimate. Adding these variables allows us to isolate unobserved ability by conditioning on known
characteristics of the recruit at the time they make a commitment and shows the relative importance
of observed and unobserved ability. It also allows us to get an idea of how omitted variable bias may
be affecting our results. In Panel A, omitting observed ability biases the coefficient on Days Prior if
these two variables are correlated and observed ability is correlated with playing in games.
The primary results from Panel A in Table 3 remain largely unchanged after controlling
for observed ability in Panel B. Controlling for observed ability, the signaling mechanism (Days
15

We drop student athletes recruited as punters and kickers from the sample.
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Prior) is as economically and statistically significant as in Panel A. Using the 2004 estimates, a
student who commits 71 days prior to NSD plays in 0.21 fewer games during the season , or
roughly 4% fewer games relative to the mean of S.90 games played (see Appendix 2).
The measure of observed ability (national ranking) predicts that highly ranked student
athletes (ranked closer to 1 than 182) play in more games . In 2004 a top-ranked athlete is
expected to play in roughly two more games relative to an unranked athlete. An athlete at the
mean national ranking plays in I. IS more games than an unranked athlete, or roughly 20% of
the average of S.90 games played. The magnitude of unobserved ability on games played
(PI x Days Prior/ Games) is roughly 18% of the magnitude of observed ability on games played

({P2 (Ranked = I) + P3 (Ranked =

I x Observed Ability) } / Games) at their respective means. Comparisons using 2003, 200S, and 2006 data and estimates yield similar conclusions (see Appendix 2).
The ranking and observed ability effect is larger than the signaling effect; however, we still
fmd considerable information in the Days Prior (signaling) variable. Finding a strong effect for
unobserved ability after controlling for observed ability reinforces the usefulness of thinking about
the commitment decision as a market where signaling occurs. By delaying commitment, recruits
are able to signal a factor that colleges cannot observe, and this factor is important enough to
explain ex post quality. Assuming that the observed ability variable sufficiently controls for
football skill, this factor represents private information about the student athlete that matters for
playing in games. Examples of unobserved ability could include work ethic, ability to grasp more
complex playing schemes, effort to stay academically eligible, and ability to prevent injury.

Alternative Estimation
The nature of our dependent variable, games played, deserves further consideration.
Games played is both bottom censored (at zero) and top censored (at the maximum number of
games played by a team). It is also a count variable, rather than a continuous variable. An OLS
regression may not be appropriate for either of these reasons, so we supplement our OLS
estimates with count and censored regression models.
The negative binomial model (a nonlinear count data model) provides consistent and
efficient parameter estimates when the dependent variable (y) is a count and E[Ylxj < V[Ylx] .
The negative binomial model assumes that the observed dependent variable is generated by a
process that mixes the Poisson and gamma distributions. The conditional density of Y is thus

with mean parameter Ilj = E[yjIXj] =ex;~ to be estimated. Here

ro is the gamma distribution and

is the dispersion parameter. 16 The log likelihood function is maximized and solved to find pN
B.
If the dependent variable (games played) is a proxy for the latent and true but unobserved
variable (games played*) (where games played* can be less than zero and greater than the
maximum number of games), then a censored regression model is appropriate. The observed
games played variable cannot differentiate between a player who should truly have zero games
(J.

16

If ex is zero, then the model collapses to a Poisson distribution; if ex is positive, then the data are overdispersed
(E [Ylxj < V[Ylxj) and an alternative to the Poisson is appropriate. Our estimates of ex in Table 4, Panel B, are positive.
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Table 3. Test of Early Commitment on Games Played (OLS)
(I)

(2)

(3)

(4)

2003

2004

2005

2006

-0.0017*
(0.0009)

-0.0020*
(0.0010)

Panel A. Does not include national ranking
-0.0026**
-0.0023*
Days prior to
National
(0.0014)
(0.0011)
Signing Day
Observations
1317
2273
R2
0.33
0.29
Panel B. Includes national ranking
Days prior to
-0.0024*
(0.0014)
National
Signing Day
Ranked = 1
2.021 **
(0.414)
-0.023**
Ranked = 1 X
Observed
(0.006)
Ability
Observations
1317
R2
0.34

3002
0.26

2893
0.11

-0.0029**
(0.0011)

-0.0020**
(0.0009)

-0.0023**
(0.0010)

2.096**
(0.278)
-0.019**
(0.003)

1.395**
(0.242)
-0.011 **
(0.003)

1.208**
(0.281)
-0.010**
(0.003)

2273
0.31

3002
0.27

2893
0.11

All regression models include dummies for year of recruitment, position played, school, and whether the student
attended a home-state school. Standard errors are clustered at school-recruiting class and are reported in parentheses.
• Significant at the 10% level.
• • Significant at the 5% level.

played and one who should have negative games played. In this case, games played is censored
at the tails and OLS may not be appropriate. Thus, we also estimate a double censored model
based on Equation I to account for the censored nature of our dependent variable: 17
for each athlete} in school s and year t :

Equation 1 if 0 < Gamesjts < max (Games ts)
0 if Gamesjts:O;; 0

Gamesjts =
{

max (Gamests) if Gamesjts ~ max (Games ts)

We reestimate Equation 1 using both censored and negative binomial regressions; Panel A
of Table 4 presents the censored regressions, and Panel B of Table 4 presents estimates from
the negative binomial model. Qualitatively there is little difference between the alternative
results and standard OLS.
In the censored regression, the impact of committing one day earlier is playing in 0.0031 to
0.0048 fewer games, which implies that an athlete committing on NSD plays in 0.18 to 0.41
more games than an athlete that commits at the average number of days prior to NSD
17

Because some schools (s) play more games in a year (/) than others, our censoring is school and year specific and may
vary across observations. We use the cnreg (censored normal regression) command in Stata (which is qualitatively
similar to the Tobit model but allows tbe upper limit censor value to vary across observations) ill our estimates. Thus,
errors are assumed to be normally distributed and estimates are derived via maximum likelihood estimation . In tbe
censored model , the number of games played (Games) is observed, but the latent variable (Games/) is unobserved.
Players can sbow their quality (lack of quality) by playing in more (fewer) games. However, in reality a player can play
in no less tban zero games and no more than 15 games.
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Table 4. Test of Early Commitment on Games Played (Censored and Count Models)
2003

Panel A. Double censored
Days prior to
- 0.0031 *
National
(0.0019)

Signing Day
Ranked = 1
Ranked = 1 X
Observed
Ability
Observations
Pseudo-R 2

2.795**
(0.591)
- 0.031 **
(0.008)
1317
0.08

Panel B. Negative binomial
Days prior to
-0.00055
(0.00036)
National
[-0.0034]
Signing Day
Ranked = 1
0.3414**
(0.0763)
[2.075]
Ranked = 1 X
-0.0038**
Observed
(0.0011)
Ability
[- 0.0232]
Observations
1317
Pseudo-R 2
0.05

2004

2005

2006

- 0.0043**
(0.0021)

-0.0048**
(0.0017)

-0.0048**
(0.0018)

4.357**
(0.547)
-0.042**
(0.006)

2.311 **
(0.458)
-0.017**
(0.006)

2.192**
(0.517)
-0.018**
(0.006)

2273
0.08

3002
0.07

2893
0.03

-0.00040
(0.00027)
[ -0.0024]
0.4565**
(0.0621)
[2.692]
- 0.0043**
(0.0008)
[-0.0251]
2273
0.04

-0.00035*
(0.00018)
[-0.0024]
0.2685**
(0.0438)
[1.862]
-0.0021 **
(0.0005)
[-0.0147]
3002
0.03

-0.00027**
(0.00012)
[-0.0025]
0.1472**
(0.0305)
[1.339]
-0.0011 **
(0.0004)
[-0.0100]
2893
0.01

All regression models include dummies for year of recruitment, position played, school, and whetber the student
attended a home-state school. Standard errors are clustered at school-recruiting class and are reported in parentheses. In
Panel B, tbe average response across athletes is reported in brackets.
* Significant at tbe 10% level.
** Significant at tbe 5% level.

(Appendix 2). As in the OLS results, the magnitude of unobserved ability on games played is
between 13% and 30% of the magnitude of observed ability.
The regression coefficients from the negative binomial model are presented in Panel B of
Table 4. Unlike the linear model, the coefficients themselves do not reveal the impact of a oneunit change in the covariates on games played; rather, these estimates need to be scaled by
exp(x;~NB), and the marginal impact varies across individuals (J) . The "average response" across
individuals is a general and concise estimate of this marginal impact, and it is summarized by
~~By for variable k in the ~NBmatrix (Cameron and Trivedi 2001). The average response is
presented in squared brackets in addition to coefficient estimates in Panel B bf Table 4.
The negative binomial model predicts that an athlete committing on NSD will play
between 0.17 and 0.21 more games than an athlete committing at the average number of days
before NSD, a result that is similar to the OLS estimates (see Appendix 2). The negative
binomial model also predicts that the average ranked player will play in roughly one fewer
game than a top ranked athlete.
A final concern with using the number of games a student-athlete played in as the
dependent variable is that it may be a noisy measure of quality. There are many reasons a
student-athlete may play in a game, for example, injury, poor performance of teammates, or
substituting for starting players when the outcome is no longer in question. With this in mind
we estimate Equation 1 using other measures of quality. As an alternative, we measure quality
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by how many points a player scores and how many yards they gain in a game. These results also
show delayed commitment to be a sign of quality: Players who sign earlier score fewer
touchdowns and have fewer yards. These results (available from the authors upon request)
include only subsamples of offensive skilled players, so the number of observations is much
smaller, which unfortunately makes them quite statistically imprecise.

5. Conclusion
The regulations on contact between a college coach and a high school student athlete
allows for information asymmetries during the recruiting process. In the context of o·ur model,
our empirical results support the idea that student athletes are able to signal private
information about their ability by delaying commitment to a university. We fmd athletes who
commit to a university earlier garner less playing time in subsequent seasons than those who
delay initial commitment. At a typical average early signing date, early committing athletes play
in 0.21 fewer games. The magnitude is close to 20% of the size of the estimated impact of
observed ability, measured at the mean. Our results demonstrate that signaling exists in an
instance where the economic agent is arguably less sophisticated than previous studies and for a
transaction prohibiting monetary exchange for services.
Appendix 1. Colleges in Our Sample
Alabama
Arizona
Arizona State
Arkansas
Auburn
Baylor
Boston College
California
Cincinnati
Clemson
Colorado
Connecticut
Duke
Florida
Florida State
Georgia
Georgia Tech
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Iowa State
Kansas
Kansas State
Kentucky
LSU
Louisville
Maryland
Miami (FL)
Michigan
Michigan State
Minnesota
Mississippi
Mississippi State

Missouri
Nebraska
North Carolina
North Carolina State
Northwestern
Notre Dame
Ohio State
Oklahoma
Oklahoma State
Oregon
Oregon State
Penn State
Pittsburgh
Purdue
Rutgers
South Carolina
South Florida
Stanford
Syracuse
Tennessee
Texas
Texas A&M
Texas Tech
UCLA
USC
Vanderbilt
Virginia
Virginia Tech
Wake Forest
Washington
Washington State
West Virginia
Wisconsin
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Appendix 2. Magnitudes of Estimated Coefficients
(I)

(2)

(3)

(4)

2003

2004

2005

2006

6.08
58.49
46.31

5.90
70.93
49.60

6.94
79.72
47.78

9.10
85.43
48.21

Panel B: OLS regression
Marginal effect evaluated at mean of:
Days prior to NSD
RankinglRanked = I
And as a percentage of mean games played
Mean days prior to NSD
Mean ranking

- 0.14
0.97

- 0.21
1.15

- 0.16
0.85

- 0.20
0. 75

Panel C: Censored regression
Marginal effect evaluated at mean of
Days prior to NSD
RankinglRanked = I
And as a percentage of mean games played
Mean days prior to NSD
Mean ranking
Panel D: Negative binomial regression
Average response evaluated at mean of
Days prior to NSD
RankinglRanked = I
And as a percentage of mean games played
Mean days prior to NSD
Mean ranking

Panel A. Means
Games played
Days prior to NSD
RankinglRanked = I

4
20

2
12

- 0.18
1.34

- 0.30
2.29

-0.38
1.49

3
22

5
39

6
21

- 0.20
1.00

- 0.1 7
1.45

-0. 19
1.16

2
16

16

3
25

3
17

2
8

- 0.41
1.32
4
14

- 0.21
0.86
2
9

Coefficient estimates from each ;egression model are evaluated a, the mean. For the ranking, the evaluation is
conditional on being ranked: ~,""ked + \~,a"ked~ I "anking X ranklranked = 1) . Recall that observed ability and ranking are
interchangeable.
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